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Abstract
Background: Prior experience and the persisting threat of influenza pandemic indicate the need for global and local 
preparedness and public health response capacity. The pandemic of 2009 highlighted the importance of such planning 
and the value of prior efforts at all levels. Our review of the public health response to this pandemic in Pune, India, 
considers the challenges of integrating global and national strategies in local programmes and lessons learned for 
influenza pandemic preparedness.
Methods: Global, national and local pandemic preparedness and response plans have been reviewed. In-depth interviews 
were undertaken with district health policy-makers and administrators who coordinated the pandemic response in Pune.
Results: In the absence of a comprehensive district-level pandemic preparedness plan, the response had to be improvised. 
Media reporting of the influenza pandemic and inaccurate information that was reported at times contributed to 
anxiety in the general public and to widespread fear and panic. Additional challenges included inadequate public health 
services and reluctance of private healthcare providers to treat people with flu-like symptoms. Policy-makers developed 
a response strategy that they referred to as the Pune plan, which relied on powers sanctioned by the Epidemic Act of 
1897 and resources made available by the union health ministry, state health department and a government diagnostic 
laboratory in Pune. 
Conclusion: The World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) global strategy for pandemic control focuses on national 
planning, but state-level and local experience in a large nation like India shows how national planning may be adapted 
and implemented. The priority of local experience and requirements does not negate the need for higher level planning. 
It does, however, indicate the importance of local adaptability as an essential feature of the planning process. Experience 
and the implicit Pune plan that emerged are relevant for pandemic preparedness and other public health emergencies. 
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Implications for policy makers
• Evidence generated through the experience of the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic should be acknowledged. Analysis of the response and 
consideration of findings should strengthen planning for preparedness.  
• Findings from our review consider strategies for ongoing activities, including continued public health surveillance of influenza, guidelines for 
criteria-based diagnosis and the need to ensure effective communication among all concerned stakeholders.
• Specific efforts are required to formulate national policies for influenza vaccination and to promote awareness of the status of primary healthcare 
providers as a high-risk group that should be vaccinated, and the priority for them to vaccinate their patients.
• Colonial legislation played a major role in developing a pandemic response in Pune, but it is important to update such legislation to acknowledge 
experience and support pandemic management strategies.
Implications for the public
The threat of recurrence of an influenza pandemic indicates a need not only for vigilance and preparedness of policy-makers but also the priority 
of community awareness. A strategy to explain risks and recommendations to the public is a fundamental interest and responsibility of the health 
system for managing future outbreaks. Our analysis of experience of the 2009 pandemic in Pune and implications incorporated in the Pune plan are 
relevant to engage the public in pandemic response planning. 
Key Messages 
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Abstract
In a recent article, Gorik Ooms has drawn attention to the normative underpinnings of the politics of 
global health. We claim that Ooms is indirectly submitting to a liberal conception of politics by framing 
the politics f global he th as a question of i dividual morality. Drawing on the th oretical works of 
Chantal Mouffe, we introduce a conflictual concept of the political as an alternative to Ooms’ onception. 
Using controversies surrounding medical treatme t of AIDS patients in developing cou tries as a case we 
underline the opportunity for political changes, through political articulation of an issue, and collective 
mobilization based on such an articulation.
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In a recent contribution to the ongoing debate about the role of power in global health, Gorik Ooms emphasizes the normative underpinnings of global health politics. 
He identifies three related problems: (1) a lack of agreement 
among global health scholars about their normative premises, 
(2) a lack of agreement between global health scholars and 
policy-makers regarding the normative premises underlying 
policy, and (3) a lack of willingness among scholars to 
clearly state their normative premises and assumptions. This 
confusion is for Ooms one of the explanations “why global 
health’s policy-makers are not implementing the knowledge 
generated by global health’s empirical scholars.” He calls 
for greater unity between scholars and between scholars 
and policy-makers, concerning the underlying normative 
premises and greater openness w en it comes to advocacy.1
We com end the eff rt to reinstate power a d pol c   
global h alth a d agree that “a purely empirical evidence-based 
approach is a fiction,” and that such a view risks covering up 
“the role of politics and power.” But by contrasting this fiction 
with global health research “driven by crises, hot issues, and 
the concerns of organized interest groups,” as a “path we are 
trying to move away from,” Ooms is submitting to a liberal 
conception of politics h  im licitly criticizes the outc mes 
of.1 A liberal view of politics ev des the constituting role of 
conflicts and reduces it to either a rationalistic, economic 
calcul tion, or an i divi ual question of moral norms. This 
is echoed in Ooms when he states that “it is not possible to 
discuss the politics of global health without discussing the 
normative premises behind the politics.”1 But what if we 
take the political as the primary level and the normative as 
secondary, or derived from the political?
That is what we will try to do here, by introducing an 
alternative conceptualization of the political and hence free 
us from the “false dilemma” Ooms also wants to escape. 
“Although constructivists have emphasized how underlying 
n rmative structures constitute actors’ identities and 
interests, they have rarely treated these normative structures 
themselves as defined and infused by power, or emphasized 
how constitutive effects also are expressions of power.”2 This 
is the starting point for the political theorist Chantal Mouffe, 
and her response is to develop an ontological conception of 
the political, where “the political belongs to our ontological 
condition.”3 Accordi g to Mouffe, society is i stituted 
through conflict. “[B]y ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of 
antagonism wh h I take to be constitutive of human societies, 
while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of practices and institutions 
through which an order is created, organizing human 
coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the 
political.”3 An issue or a topic needs to be contested to become 
political, and such a contestation concerns public action and 
creates a ‘we’ and ‘they’ form of collective identification. But 
the fixation of social r lations is partial and precarious, since 
antagonism is an ever pres nt possibility. To politicize an issue 
and be able to mobilize support, one needs to represe t the 
world in a conflictual manner “with opposed camps with 
which people can identify.”3 
Ooms uses the case of “increasing international aid spending 
on AIDS treatment” to illustrate his point.1 He frames the 
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 a rece t c tri ti  t  t e g i g e ate a t t e 
r le f er i  gl al ealt , rik s e asizes 
t e r ative er i i gs f gl al ealt  litics. 
e i e tifies t ree relate  r le s: (1) a lack f agree e t 
a g gl al ealt  sc lars a t t eir r ative re ises, 
(2) a lack f agree e t et ee  gl al ealt  sc lars a  
licy- akers regar i g t e r ative re ises erlyi g 
licy, a  (3) a lack f illi g ess a g sc lars t  
clearly state t eir r ative re ises a  ass ti s. is 
c f si  is f r s e f t e ex la ati s “ y gl al 
ealt ’s licy- akers are t i le e ti g t e k le ge 
ge erate  y gl al ealt ’s e irical sc lars.” e calls 
f r greater ity et ee  sc lars a  et ee  sc lars 
a  licy- akers, c cer i g t e erlyi g r ative 
re ises a  greater e ess he  it c es t  a v cacy.1
e c e  t e eff rt t  rei state er a  litics i  
gl al alt  a  agree t at “a rely e irical evi e ce- ase  
a r ac  is a ficti ,” a  t at s c  a vie  r sk c veri g  
“t  r le f lit cs a  er.” t y c trasti g t is ficti  
it  gl al ealt  researc  “ rive  y crises, t iss es, a  
t e c cer s f rga ize  i terest gr s,” as a “ at  e are 
tryi g t  ve a ay fr ,” s is s itti g t  a li eral 
c ce ti  f litics e i plicitly criticizes t e tco es 
f.1  li eral vie  f litics eva es t e c stit ti g r le f 
c flicts a  re ces it t  eit er a rati alistic, ec ic 
calc l ti , r a  i ivi al esti  f ral r s. is 
is ec e  i  s e  e states t at “it is t ssi le t  
isc ss t e litics f gl al ealt  it t isc ssi g t e 
r ative re ises e i  t e litics.”1 t at if e 
take t e litical as t e ri ary level a  t e r ative as 
sec ary, r erive  fr  t e litical?
at is at e ill try t   ere, y i tr ci g a  
alter ative c ce t alizati  f t e litical a  e ce free 
s fr  t e “false ile a” s als  a ts t  esca e. 
“ lt g  c str ctivists ave e asize   erlyi g 
or ative str ct res c stit te act rs’ i e tities a  
i terests, t ey ave rarely treate  t ese r ative str ct res 
t e selves as efi e  a  i f se  y er, r e asize  
 c stit tive effects als  are ex ressi s f er.”2 is 
is t e starti g i t f r t e litical t e rist a tal ffe, 
a  er res se is t  evel  a  t l gical c ce ti  f 
t e litical, ere “t e litical el gs t  r t l gical 
c iti .”3 cc r ing t  ffe, s ciety is instit te  
t r g  c flict. “[ ]y ‘t e litical’ I ea  t e i e si  f 
a tag is  ic  I take t  e c stit tive f a  s cieties, 
ile y ‘ litics’ I ea  t e set f ractices a  i stit ti s 
t r g  ic  a  er is create , rga izi g a  
c xiste ce i  t e c text f c flict ality r vi e  y t e 
litical.”3  iss e r a t ic ee s t  e c teste  t  ec e 
litical, a  s c  a c testati  c cer s lic acti  a  
creates a ‘ e’ a  ‘t ey’ f r  f c llective i e tificati . t 
t e fixati  f s cial relati s is artial a  recari s, si ce 
a tag is  is a  ever rese t ssi ility.  liticize a  iss e 
a  e a le t  ilize s rt, e ee s t  re rese t t e 
rl  i  a c flict al a er “ it  se  ca s it  
ic  e le ca  i e tify.”3 
s ses t e case f “i creasi g i ter ati al ai  s e i g 
 I S treat e t” t  ill strate is i t.1 e fra es t e 
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Background 
Influenza is notable for its health and economic impact.1,2 
It occurs in two epidemiological forms; epidemics and 
pandemics. Annual epidemics of seasonal influenza result in 
3–5 million cases of severe illness and between 250 000 and 
500 000 deaths worldwide.3 The economic impact includes 
direct costs (medicines, hospitalization), indirect costs 
(absenteeism and hampered productivity) and intangible 
costs of suffering (pain and reduced quality of life).4 Influenza 
pandemics are infrequent compared with seasonal influenza, 
but they are widely feared public health emergencies because 
they entail serious social disruption and substantial economic 
cost.5 Influenza pandemics are characterized by severe illness 
and high mortality, and cases typically affect not only high-
risk groups but also others in the population, including young 
healthy adults, who are less vulnerable to seasonal influenza.6 
Pune district in Maharashtra, India—both the urban and 
rural areas—has a history of seasonal and pandemic influenza 
outbreaks.7 Although data on morbidity and mortality are 
limited, available evidence shows that pregnant women and 
children under 5 years-of-age are typically among the most 
severely affected by regular influenza outbreaks.8,9 The district 
was the epicentre of the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic in 
India, popularly referred to as “swine flu.”10 A study assessing 
its impact documented substantial hospitalization (8.6% 
of cases) and mortality, with one death per 11 confirmed 
hospitalized cases.11
The severe impact of the prior influenza pandemics of 1918, 
1957, and 1968 highlighted the need for preparedness and 
public health capacity.8,12,13 Other pandemic threats since the 
year 2000—severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 
and avian influenza A (H5N1) beginning in Southeast Asia 
in 2004, which spread globally the following year—further 
underscored the importance of containment strategies and 
public health response capacity.12,14,15 Although its impact was 
milder than anticipated, the influenza pandemic of 2009 was 
the first of the 21st century.16 
Since its inception in 1948, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) has acknowledged responsibilities for developing 
and updating strategies to contain and control both pandemic 
and seasonal influenza through global preparedness and 
national programmes.17 Although pandemics are global, the 
WHO encourages member nations to develop their own 
national influenza programmes based on WHO’s guidance 
for pandemic preparedness and control of influenza that 
includes a planning checklist covering essential and desirable 
elements of pandemic preparedness.18,19 Nearly 100 countries 
made use of their own national plans in their response to the 
2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic.20,21 Only a few countries—
mostly European countries and one Southeast Asian country, 
Thailand—have updated their plans based on the 2009 H1N1 
influenza pandemic experience. Such revision focussed 
mainly on assessing the impact of pharmaceutical, medical 
and non-medical intervention.20,22,23 Updated plans did not 
explicitly discuss questions concerning integration of global, 
national and local policies and their implementation,13,19 and 
the process of adapting global strategies in local programmes 
remains challenging.1,14,24,25 This question has motivated our 
study. 
Study Aims
This study was undertaken to examine public health 
experience in the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic in Pune. It 
considered relevant policy at various levels and implications 
for development of what policy-makers refer to as either the 
Pune model or Pune plan for pandemic preparedness and 
response. The specific aims were as follows:
1)	 Review authoritative pandemic influenza planning 
strategies at global, national and state levels.
2)	 Present key points in the course and response to the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic in Pune.
3)	 Explain the provisions of the Pune plan and its relevance 
for preparedness for future pandemics.
4)	 Examine policy-makers’ reflections on the pandemic 
experiences and pandemic planning.
Methods
Our analysis of the policy response to the 2009 H1N1 
influenza pandemic in Pune included a documentary review 
and in-depth interviews of concerned policy-makers and 
administrators. Relevant documents indicating global, 
national and local level pandemic preparedness and response 
plans were identified and reviewed, and in-depth interviews 
conducted with administrators and public health officials 
who coordinated the pandemic response in Pune. 
Study Setting and Design
The tropical monsoon climate of Pune district is associated 
with regular outbreaks of seasonal influenza.26 The district 
was more seriously affected, however, by the 2009 H1N1 
influenza pandemic.10,11 Moreover, Pune is not just an 
influenza problem site; it is also the site of key resources such 
as a national laboratory where virological testing was done 
during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. Furthermore, a 
major vaccine production facility, the Serum Institute of India 
(SII) is located in Pune. The SII was asked to develop a live 
attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) in the framework of the 
WHO’s effort to strengthen influenza vaccine production 
in developing countries. The experience of the 2009 H1N1 
influenza pandemic in Pune was a focus of attention for 
the entire country, and it served as a test case for India’s 
preparedness and response in real time. 
Review of Planning Documents
Our review of planning documents identified essential 
features of influenza public health policy at local, national 
and global levels of pandemic planning. We focussed on 
authoritative primary source planning documents at each level 
rather than a systematic review of the secondary literature. 
Consequently, key documents reviewed included a WHO 
guidance document for pandemic influenza preparedness and 
response,27 the Government of India’s action plan for H1N1 
influenza,28 and a Maharashtra state contingency planning 
document (see Supplementary file). These documents were 
downloaded from the respective websites of the WHO; the 
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of 
India (MoHFW, GoI); and the Maharashtra Public Health 
Department. 
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Key Informant Interviews 
Health system contacts, policy documents and news coverage 
during the period from June 2009 to August 2010 enabled us 
to identify eight public health officials and administrators for 
key informant interviews. An open-ended interview agenda 
was formulated to address our study objectives, inquiring 
about the response to the pandemic over its course with 
regard to planning and implementation. We then asked the 
respondents to reflect on the process and its effectiveness, 
and to consider implications for future pandemic planning. 
We also asked them about details of development and 
implementation of the strategic response plan, challenges 
of essential tasks, experience of the planning process, 
lessons learned and consideration of implications regarding 
preparedness planning for future pandemics. The interview 
agendas are provided in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. Two 
researchers were trained to conduct these interviews in 
Marathi (local language), and an informed consent form was 
prepared to obtain respondents’ permission for the interviews 
and audio recording. 
Data Management and Analysis
Our analysis proceeded in three steps. We first extracted key 
elements of the pandemic preparedness and response plans 
from the policy documents to characterize the strategy for 
containment and control. Next we summarized the course of 
the Pune pandemic experience and milestones that defined 
periods for which particular policy priorities were relevant, 
from April 2009 to August 2010. Finally, we reviewed key 
elements of the policy response and implementation based on 
data from in-depth interviews with regard to experience and 
reflections of the policy-makers. 
Results 
The results are presented into two parts, first with a review of 
global, national and state plans considering implications for 
the district-level planning. Second, we focus on experience 
in Pune—reviewing the course of the pandemic, the public 
health response, features of the Pune plan that emerged and 
reflections of policy-maker key informants.
Global, National and State Plans for Influenza Pandemic 
Response
World Health Organization’s Global Influenza Programme 
The WHO’s guide for global and national preparedness and 
response27 considered the periods before, during and after 
local outbreaks of the global pandemic.18 It was intended 
to serve as a guide, but not replacement, for national 
plans. The document explained the role of the WHO, and 
recommendations were presented with reference to six phases 
of a pandemic. These include phases 1–3 of predominantly 
animal infections and a few human infections. During these 
earlier phases, countries are expected to exercise and review 
national pandemic preparedness and response plans, develop 
a robust surveillance system, promote preventive public health 
measures, prepare for health system scale-up and complete 
a communications plan to communicate risks and provide 
regular updates about the course of the pandemic. During 
phase 4, which is characterized by sustained human-to-human 
infection, countries should implement containment measures 
by activating a contingency plan, increase surveillance, and 
promote recommended public health measures to prevent or 
reduce risk of infection. Phases 5 and 6 involve widespread 
human infection, during which resources are required to 
implement coherent and comprehensive containment and 
mitigation strategies.
National and State-Level Preparedness Plans With Reference to 
the Global Framework for Pandemic Phases 5 and 6 
Table 1 presents key activities of phases 5 and 6 that are 
documented in global, national and state-level plans for 
influenza control. Based on the framework indicated by the 
WHO, it indicates five critical considerations for preparedness 
and response across global, national and state levels.
According to the WHO guide, advanced pandemic phases 5 
and 6 are declared when sustained community-level outbreaks 
caused by the same influenza virus have been identified in 
two or more countries in one WHO region (phase 5), and 
in another country in another WHO region (phase 6).27 In 
phases 5 and 6, countries should provide leadership and 
multi-sectoral coordination, implement mitigation measures 
specified in the national plan, and provide updates to the 
public and other stakeholders on the course of the pandemic 
and measures implemented to mitigate its threat. During 
the pandemic — but after the peak — experience should be 
evaluated, and plans for preparedness and response should be 
updated based on lessons learned. 
India’s National Plan 
A national Action Plan for Pandemic Preparedness and 
Response28 was prepared in the MoHFW, GoI, and published 
in June 2009 by the Directorate General of Health Services 
(DGHS). This document presented India’s national policy plan 
for influenza pandemic management, and it focused on the 
priorities of phases 5 and 6 of the WHO guide. Development 
of the Indian plan also relied on experience adapted from the 
Contingency Plan for Management of Human Cases of Avian 
Influenza, published by the DGHS in 2005.29 
The plan for managing pandemic influenza included strategies 
for early detection, appropriate case management and public 
health measures based on guidelines, protocols and standard 
operating procedures (SoPs). It presented contingent 
strategies to address two scenarios, according to whether or 
not the pandemic had already reached India. These strategies 
were formulated with reference to the five-fold framework of 
the WHO guide.27 
The national action plan intended to provide a practical 
framework to guide states that were implementing strategies 
for their districts. Some points in the WHO guide, however, 
were not addressed. There was no provision for testing and 
revising the national plan, and recommendations of the WHO 
checklist for legal and ethical issues were not considered in 
the national plan.
Maharashtra’s State Plan
The state of Maharashtra also published its Contingency 
Plan for Management of Influenza A H1N1 in June 2009 by 
the Directorate of Health Services (see Supplementary file). 
It described the state-level institutional framework and how 
the state and districts should coordinate management of the 
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influenza pandemic. 
Although the state’s plan was expected to provide operational 
guidelines and training for capacity building of the districts, 
the state plan only described needed action in response to the 
pandemic. Operational guidelines indicating responsibilities 
and how recommended action might be implemented were not 
detailed. Furthermore, mechanisms for review and revision of 
plans were not covered in the state-level plan. The document 
did mention that the plan would be sent to responsible offices 
of the Central Government, such as the MoHFW, GoI, and 
the National Disaster Management Authorities. Nevertheless, 
details of centre and state interactions to enable solicitation 
and incorporation of comments and advice from the central 
government were lacking. 
Framework From Global, National and State Plans for Analysing 
a District-Level Response
The planning documents indicate particular priorities at the 
various stages of pandemic experience, acknowledging that 
each poses distinct challenges. Initially, the threat of pandemic 
in the early stages of the outbreak requires strengthening 
capacity of the health system to respond with containment 
and mitigation strategies well before the full outbreak ensues. 
Preparing for a public health emergency should begin much 
earlier. Containment and mitigation strategies become ever 
more compelling priorities as the outbreak becomes more 
severe. An overview of these considerations for district-level 
planning, which also acknowledges the framework of the three 
levels of policy documents summarized above, is outlined in 
Figure 1. Such considerations are relevant for analysis of the 
influenza pandemic experience, the Pune plan and reflections 
of policy-makers.
Elaboration of the Course and Response to the Pandemic in 
Pune 
Key Informants
We initially contacted eight public health officials and 
administrators identified from policy documents and news 
Table 1. Preparedness and Response Components for Phases 5 and 6 at Global, National and State Levels
Preparedness and 
Response Global National (India) State (Maharashtra)
Leadership and 
coordination of multi-
sectoral resources
Provide leadership and 
coordination to multi-
sectoral resources
Guidelines for sectoral co-ordination, institutional 
framework at national, state and district levels 
indicating roles and responsibilities
Description of institutional framework for 
Maharashtra  state
Monitoring and 
assessment of evolving 
pandemic: impact and 
mitigating measures
Active monitoring and 
assessment of evolving 
pandemic, its impact and 
mitigating measures
Mechanism for strengthening surveillance, 
laboratory support and airport screening during 
phases 5 and 6 
Description of operational aspects of active 
and passive surveillance and identifying 
suspected cases
Behavioural, social 
and pharmaceutical 
interventions
Implement individual, 
societal and 
pharmaceutical measures
Mechanisms for case investigation, infection control 
practices, pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical 
interventions 
Guidelines for implementing public health 
measures and details regarding planning 
logistics, and supply of equipment and 
drugs
Implementation of health 
system contingency plans
Implement contingency 
plans for health systems at 
all levels
Mechanisms for training healthcare staff and 
mobilizing the healthcare system  to cope with 
influx of patients 
Guidelines for clinical management and 
training paramedical and medical staff
Update general public and 
stakeholders
Ongoing updates to 
general public and all 
stakeholders
Communicating situation-specific information 
to general public to minimize fear and promote 
appropriate health-seeking behaviour
Guidelines for establishing a control room 
and appointing a spokesperson
District-level pandemic planning
Preparing for emergency
• Establish a district-level core 
committee for pandemic control
• Develop or update a district action 
plan
Containment
• Screening for imported cases 
among travellers (international 
and Indian)
• Surveillance to detect indigenous 
cases in the district
• Isolation and contact tracing
Mitigation
• Laboratory support
• Case management
• Non-pharmaceutical prevention 
strategies
• Pharmaceutical interventions
• Monitoring, evaluation and public 
communication
Figure 1. Framework for Analysing District-Level Public Health Response to Influenza Pandemic.
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coverage in September 2013 through telephone calls and 
personal visits. Five were available and agreeable to participate 
in key informant interviews, which were completed by June 
2014. These key informants included the chief administrative 
officer (CAO) of Pune district, the former assistant 
administrative officer of Pune city, the city medical officer, the 
former in-charge official of the government-run infectious 
diseases hospital and a senior officer of the government 
diagnostic laboratory, Pune. 
A study information sheet was given to all respondents before 
their interviews. Verbal consent included an agreement that 
respondents would not be identified by name without explicit 
permission, although roles and generalized designations 
are specified to indicate the rationale for selection and 
perspectives represented by respondents. The average 
duration of these interviews was one hour. All but one of the 
interviews were audio recorded, and for the respondent who 
agreed to the interview but declined audio recording, hand-
written interview notes were prepared. Seven interviews 
were conducted at the hospital or office workplace of the 
respondents, and the interview with a former assistant 
administrative officer of Pune city was conducted at his 
residence. 
Course of the Pandemic
The pandemic events span the period from May 2009 when 
the first cases were diagnosed in India to August 2010 when 
WHO declared the pandemic was over. The events sketched 
in Figure 2 and elaborated in the text below were gleaned 
from the interviews and media reports.
On May 16, 2009 the first case of pandemic influenza in India 
was detected in Hyderabad. A month later, a software engineer 
returning to Pune from the United States was admitted to the 
infectious diseases hospital in Pune. On June 22, 2009, he 
became the first imported case of H1N1 influenza in Pune.30 
Sporadic cases of H1N1 infection were diagnosed through the 
end of July 2009, but transmission was not widespread. An 
outbreak in a school situated in a highly populated Western 
suburb of Pune was widely publicised by the media during 
this period. 
The first influenza pandemic death in India occurred in 
a private hospital in Pune on August 3, 2009. Widespread 
community infection followed soon after that, accompanied 
by panic fuelled by a lack of authoritative information about 
the risk of infection. The family of the deceased accused 
the hospital of negligence and filed a case in the consumer 
court. Newspapers gave extensive coverage to the case. This 
made private doctors reluctant to treat patients with flu-like 
symptoms, and after 4 August, long queues of symptomatic 
patients were being seen at three government hospitals in 
Pune.31 Within a week, facing shortages of testing kits, these 
hospitals had no further capacity for testing and admitting 
patients. 
Medical stores in Pune also faced shortages of supplies, such 
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as sanitizers, eucalyptus oil and vitamin C tablets, which were 
popularly thought to afford protection from H1N1 influenza.32 
At this point public demand for vaccination was high, but 
vaccines were unavailable. Confusion and chaos resulted from 
a lack of public understanding about the diagnosis, treatment 
and prevention, and it persisted through August 2009. A year 
later, the WHO declared the pandemic to be over. 
Public Health Response 
Key features of the public health and administrative response 
over the course of the outbreak are outlined in Table 2 and 
elaborated in the text that follows.
After the first H1N1 case in India was announced, Pune’s 
public health department recognized that it was needed to 
prepare for an emergency and immediately began planning 
a pandemic response. The local health department assumed 
major responsibility for this containment strategy before 
widespread outbreak. It focused primarily on stockpiling 
antivirals and personal protective equipment (PPE, viz, 
masks and gloves). The public health officials we interviewed 
in Pune explained that it was clear when the first influenza 
pandemic case was diagnosed in Hyderabad, that Pune would 
surely face a similar threat. Climate and international contacts 
through the IT industry were notable, which contributed to 
vulnerability. Pune’s public health department was in close 
contact with the central government, particularly with the 
national institute in Delhi responsible for planning and 
implementing the public health response to communicable 
disease emergencies. 
At this early stage of the outbreak, Pune district did not have its 
own pandemic response plan, and so it relied on guidance of 
the central and state governments. Although the importance 
of disseminating timely and accurate information for the 
public was recognized, efforts were inadequate to forestall 
growing concerns and mounting public anxiety. After WHO 
classified the pandemic as phase 5 in the first week of May 
2009, the Government of India began screening international 
passengers at all of the country’s international airports. This 
early measure aimed to detect infected persons who might 
spark transmission. By June 5, 2009, of the 1229 passengers 
who arrived on international flights in Pune, at least 11 
suspected cases with symptoms of pandemic influenza had 
voluntarily reported to the local government’s infectious 
diseases hospital in Pune and were isolated for a day. None of 
them, however, tested positive for the virus.
After H1N1 cases were diagnosed in various parts of the 
country in June, nine surveillance centres, including one 
in Pune, were set up by the national diagnostic laboratory. 
They were established to detect indigenous cases, especially 
among people in contact with confirmed cases. Although 
our respondents could not specify precise numbers and such 
data are unavailable, this approach was a priority in the early 
efforts to contain the outbreak. 
With support from the state, the Pune public health 
department set up a 20-bed isolation ward at the local 
government infectious diseases hospital in the month of May 
2009. This was the first and only designated isolation ward 
for H1N1 cases. According to the official who had been in 
charge, the ward was small but it conformed to government 
guidelines, and it was in other ways an ideal setup for an 
isolation ward with good ventilation and protected access. 
According to policy, all cases of confirmed pandemic 
influenza were quarantined at the local government’s 
infectious diseases hospital for one week and treated with the 
antiviral drug Tamiflu (Osletamivir). Close contacts of these 
cases were traced and given Tamiflu as chemoprophylaxis. 
Our informant advised that the procedures for isolation and 
contact tracing were meticulously implemented. 
On July 27, 2009 the CAO of Pune district, who was responsible 
for coordinating the public health response during the 
pandemic, held the first press conference to assure the public 
that the situation was under control. Up to the last week of 
July 2009, there had been 55 pandemic influenza cases. His 
message asserted that management of these cases and follow 
Table 2. Public Health Response to Influenza Pandemic Experience in Pune
Date/Period Public Health Response
May 2009 Pune's Public Health Department began preparing pandemic response
May 16, 2009–Aug 2, 2009 Airport screening, contact tracing and other strategies implemented
Aug 4, 2009 Maharashtra State Government invoked the Epidemic Act of 1897 in Pune district to control the pandemic
Aug 5, 2009 PSFMC constituted
Aug 6, 2009 PSFMC developed an action plan to contain influenza pandemic
Aug 6, 2009–Aug 18, 2009 Screening centres established throughout the city
Aug 6, 2009 SoPs prepared in government-run tertiary care hospital for managing influenza pandemic patients
Aug 6, 2009–Aug 13, 2009 Private hospitals with ICU facilities identified and engaged for seriously ill influenza pandemic patients
Aug 6, 2009–Aug 13, 2009 Standard reporting system developed for pandemic cases, deaths and treated patients
Aug 6, 2009–Aug 8, 2009 
Media briefing policy implemented for authoritative information on prevention, help seeking and treatment over the course 
of pandemic
Aug 11, 2009–Aug 25, 2009 Educational institutions and entertainment facilities closed for 2 weeks
Nov 2009 District-level action plan prepared for wave II of influenza pandemic
July 14, 2010 Launch of locally developed and produced LAIV by SII, located in Pune
June 22, 2009–Aug 10, 2010 Real-time PCR technology at government diagnostic laboratory made available for rapid and accurate diagnosis
Abbreviations: PSFMC, Pune Swine Flu Management Committee; LAIV, live attenuated influenza vaccine; SII, Serum Institute of India; PCR, polymerase chain 
reaction; ICU, intensive care unit; SoPs, standard operating procedures.
Data sources: Primarily key informant interviews and supplemented by media reports.
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up identifying their close contacts was proceeding according 
to the prescribed protocol of the central government.
Public Anxiety Required Further Action
After the first Indian pandemic death on August 3, 2009 in 
Pune, the level of concern rapidly escalated. In the absence of 
adequate information about what was happening and what to 
do, long queues of people with flu-like symptoms presented 
at the city’s infectious diseases hospital. The officer in charge 
estimated that after 3 August, “There were nearly six to 
seven thousand people every day in the regular Out-Patient 
Department (OPD).” Print and television media publicized 
these developments. On 7 August, The Indian Express 
newspaper wrote that “The infectious diseases Hospital was 
flooded with citizens for the past two days owing to a sudden 
rush after many general practitioners sent the patients to the 
hospital.”33 Press coverage criticised the health system’s lack of 
preparedness and capacity to respond to the pandemic. 
Media attention and public concern demanded urgent action 
from the government. In the absence of an adequate pandemic 
response plan for the district, preparing one became a top 
priority. Two days after the first H1N1 influenza fatality, the 
Maharashtra government invoked the Epidemic Act of 1897 
in Pune district. This act empowers centre, state or district 
administrators to issue regulations and impose measures to 
limit the spread of infection in the country, state or district. 
After invoking the Epidemic Act, failure to comply with 
sanctioned policy became a punishable offense under Indian 
Penal Code.34 
The CAO took charge of coordinating the pandemic response 
for Pune district. Although the vintage law from more than 
a century ago helped to raise public awareness and provided 
substantial power, its limitations were also notable. He 
explained: 
“It helped to make people aware … It was a good tool 
enabling the administration to engage private or government 
hospitals for any preventive measures or treatment services. 
But the act is old and lacks needed guidelines for responding 
to the epidemic. To control the situation in Pune we had to 
devise mechanisms for two broad aims: for prevention and 
containment of infection and for treatment of the infected 
people.”
Whatever its limitations, invoking the Epidemic Act of 1897 
authorized the district administration of urban and rural 
Pune to work together. The district administration and local 
health department convened and conducted joint meetings of 
a collective body known as the Pune Swine Flu Management 
Committee (PSFMC). 
As efforts to formulate a Pune plan were developing, the media, 
elected officials of city government (corporators) and heads of 
medical education institutions advocated for implementation 
of the Mexico model, which involved cordoning off the whole 
city.35 After reviewing and scrutinising this approach, the 
PSFMC concluded that such drastic measures—restricting 
movement of people in public places and travel into and out 
of the city—were impractical and could not be implemented 
in Pune. In the absence of alternative models or guidelines 
for managing this health crisis, the management committee 
developed a strategy for Pune district based on key elements 
of existing frameworks. Responding to the public outcry 
and over a period of 10 days from 3 August, centres were 
established for screening, and to prescribe and provide Tamiflu 
tablets for symptomatic patients without waiting for results 
of diagnostic swabs. Schools and cinema halls were closed, 
and development of a coordinated pandemic management 
strategy for Pune district proceeded at an accelerated pace. 
The Pune Plan
The coordinated strategy that emerged from the ensuing 
process was designated by our policy-maker respondents as 
the Pune plan of pandemic response. It began by establishing 
51 testing centres across the city to reduce the burden on staff 
of infectious diseases hospitals run by the Pune Municipal 
Corporation. The Pune plan elaborated elements of the 
mitigation strategy noted in Figure 1, consistent with the global, 
national and state plans. This framework included laboratory 
support, clinical case management, non-pharmaceutical 
prevention strategies, pharmaceutical interventions, outbreak 
monitoring, and public communication. 
1. Laboratory support: The laboratory facility of the 
government diagnostic laboratory in Pune was a unique 
resource contributing to the city’s pandemic response capacity. 
From May 2009, a nasal or throat swab from each suspected 
patient with flu-like symptoms was tested for H1N1 influenza 
virus. Real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) technology 
was used for accurate testing, and in most cases lab results 
were available within 12 hours through a specially developed 
SMS-based system.28 This diagnostic laboratory facility not 
only enabled timely clinical diagnosis, it also provided a 
capacity for monitoring and research to guide policy. Data 
from the diagnostic laboratory supported discontinuation of 
contact tracing as infections became widespread. They also 
informed criteria to determine who should receive treatment 
with Tamiflu. 
2. Case management: Fear of punishment for misdiagnosis 
and mismanagement of H1N1 cases made private medical 
providers reluctant to see suspected cases, and so they referred 
many more than they otherwise would to the government 
infectious diseases hospital. As the number of hospitalized 
cases increased, two more government hospitals were 
designated to manage pandemic influenza, one managed by 
the local Pune Municipal Corporation and the other a state-
run tertiary care hospital in Pune. The committee decided 
that patients without complications would be managed at this 
local government hospital, and those who needed a higher 
level of care would be managed at the state-run tertiary care 
hospital. 
An additional pandemic care centre with 15 beds was 
established at a state government-run tertiary care hospital 
in the city. These beds were in a unit isolated from other 
wards, well-ventilated and well-lit. It also had a separate area 
for entry and exit, a central oxygen supply and sufficient 
ventilators. The number of medical and paramedical staff 
in Pune was insufficient for the round-the-clock influx of 
influenza pandemic patients, and the Maharashtra State 
government deployed 200-300 medical and paramedical staff 
from other districts. The additional clinical staff supported 
both government and private hospitals. PPE (masks and 
gloves) and Tamiflu tablets were supplied by the Maharashtra 
State.
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Three tertiary care government hospitals could not meet 
increasing needs of urban Pune and surrounding areas for 
testing and hospitalization. The PSFMC also identified 
thirteen private hospitals with intensive care units (ICUs), 
and following the protocol of the national plan, isolation 
wards were set-up in these hospitals. 
Morbidity and mortality data were consolidated from all 
centres for monitoring and evaluation. Standard formats 
were developed for H1N1-positive case reporting, hospital 
admissions, patients who required ventilators, the distribution 
of Tamiflu tablets and H1N1 deaths. The PSFMC required all 
hospitals seeing H1N1-positive cases to report these details 
on a daily basis using, either on a prescribed paper form or 
using an electronic format made available to them. 
3. Non-pharmaceutical interventions: As the outbreak 
progressed, the PSFMC developed a range of preventive 
public health measures to limit transmission. Some were 
based on minimising contact in institutions and communities 
(eg, closing schools, cinema halls, markets and malls). The 
committee conducted meetings with the chief operating 
officers or other leaders of these institutions and ordered them 
to close their facility for 15 days; other measures focussed 
on personal risk behaviours (eg, handwashing and cough 
etiquette). Relevant information was disseminated through 
print and electronic media. Public cooperation was important 
to motivate support for inconvenient interventions, such as 
closing public institutions. Media were enlisted to explain the 
rationale for limiting and participating in public gatherings, 
as a curfew-like situation prevailed for almost two weeks in 
Pune city until the end of August 2009.
4. Pharmaceutical interventions: antivirals and vaccine: 
Antivirals and vaccines are important resources for control of 
influenza. After the country’s first death and the proliferation 
of cases that followed, Pune received a bulk supply of the 
antiviral Tamiflu on May 10, 2009 from the one million 
tablets allotted to the state government. An adequate supply 
of Tamiflu was available in Pune throughout the course of the 
pandemic.
The Government of India made an imported inactivated 
monovalent vaccine available for healthcare staff in March 
2010. The indigenous LAIV became available in India later, 
in July 2010. Although the more costly imported vaccine was 
provided without charge, respondents explained that many 
medical officers—including doctors, and other healthcare 
staff—did not take the vaccine. Misconceptions exaggerating 
risk of Guillain-Barré syndrome and the erroneous idea 
that prior exposure to seasonal influenza had already made 
healthcare providers immune were reasons offered for vaccine 
refusal and low uptake among healthcare staff. A city medical 
officer explained, 
“Injectable vaccine was available. It was for healthcare staff. 
But nobody was ready to take the vaccine. We had received 
2000 doses of injectable swine flu vaccine from Delhi. Even 
though we made it compulsory only 100 persons took the 
injectable vaccine.” 
Development of the indigenous vaccine (LAIV) resulted from 
an initiative of the WHO and the presence of the SII, a major 
vaccine manufacturer in Pune. The WHO provided the LAIV 
technology to the SII in July 2009, which enabled development 
and production of ‘Nasovac.’36 This was the first indigenously 
produced vaccine in India against H1N1 influenza, and it 
became available for use in July 2010.37 Although vaccine 
uptake was high in 2010 and 2011, from 2011 in the aftermath 
of the pandemic, uptake dropped. The pandemic had been 
declared officially to be over, and no guidelines or priority 
existed to recommend this or other vaccines for prevention 
of seasonal influenza. Even though infection continued 
and still persists, fear of influenza pandemic in the general 
population had abated. A health officer of the Pune Municipal 
Corporation explained, 
“People were very scared in 2009-2010, but slowly the 
number of (H1N1) cases decreased. By 2012 there were 
very few cases, and people had almost forgotten about 
swine flu. This swine flu has now become endemic.” 
5. Outbreak monitoring, evaluation and public communication:
Accurate and timely epidemic intelligence and public 
information is critical for managing any infectious disease 
outbreak, but no such information was available in Pune 
until the end of August 2009. The former CAO explained 
the complexity of the task of compiling, analysing, using and 
reporting relevant data: 
“There were three government hospitals, many private 
hospitals, many beds [in addition to those designated for 
H1N1 influenza patients] and many isolation wards. But 
within a few weeks we devised the mechanism to collate the 
data from all private and government hospitals.” 
Elaborating further, he explained that in the early days of the 
pandemic, the single press conference held at the end of July 
had not been enough to explain the issues and assure the public 
that the situation would be controlled. After invoking the 
Epidemic Act, a strategy for media briefings was developed. 
The PSFMC gave daily updates to media representatives 
covering morbidity, mortality and prevention measures. A 
group of spokespersons was organized for daily information 
outreach to the public through the media. These efforts to 
explain the public health response were intended to build 
public trust and credibility for the district administration. 
Key Informants’ Reflection and Assessment of the Pune Plan
Our informants acknowledged the need for pandemic 
preparedness planning and problems resulting from its 
initial absence. They also acknowledged a tendency in 
Indian public health services to ignore planning needs until 
a crisis demanded a response. The former in-charge of the 
government-run infectious diseases hospital elaborated the 
point as follows: 
“We Indians are better at dealing with a crisis situation, 
meaning we can tackle the crisis very well but we don’t have 
a long term planning. Though this experience has increased 
awareness about influenza illness, it did not initiate any 
fundamental change at Government level with regard to 
influenza pandemic preparedness. Still we don’t have public 
health machinery to document the influenza burden. In our 
country from state to district level, health is never considered 
as an important subject. As a result, we don’t do any planning, 
and ultimately it leads to delay in taking decisions. It’s a red 
tape system, so nobody takes initiative unless told to.” 
Some positive effects on planning, however, also resulted 
from the pandemic experience. The struggle to set up an 
appropriate response system and the lessons learned during 
Purohit et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2018, 7(2), 154–166162
the first year of the pandemic prompted PSFMC to prepare 
an action plan for an anticipated second wave. The action 
plan for a second wave was based on prospective estimates 
of nearly 80 000 cases that may require hospitalization. This 
action plan is based on the state’s contingency plan, and it 
focussed on health services planning for a large number of 
seriously ill patients. SoPs for managing H1N1 patients were 
also prepared by the state government tertiary care hospital 
in Pune.38 Both were by-products of the Pune pandemic 
response.
Discussion 
Our review indicates the apparent difficulties and challenges 
of preparedness planning15; and this analysis brings several 
practical issues into focus. Our review of the background, 
setting and development of the Pune plan and its broader 
implications for pandemic planning highlights the relevance 
of integrating global, national and state-level policy to guide 
the response locally at the district level. This point is consistent 
with the finding of a review committee commissioned by 
WHO to examine the International Health Regulations (IHR 
2005) and experience gained from the global pandemic of 
2009, which also highlights the importance of integrating 
global, national and local planning.39 
Our review explains how guidance for global, Indian national 
and Maharashtra state public health responses to the pandemic 
were rooted in these various documents published in 2009. 
Each level addressed similar or complementary issues, but 
their scope was distinctive. The WHO’s plan had been 
formulated to guide and support national planning. India’s 
national planning document aimed to support state planning, 
and the state plans aimed to facilitate district planning. In 
India, as the threat of an imminent pandemic became clear in 
2009, it evoked a mix of concern about limited public health 
capacity and anticipation of an opportunity to rise to the 
challenge of preparing an effective pandemic response.40 
Both the higher-level framework and the experience in 
Pune shaped development of the Pune plan. The ‘Pune plan’ 
that emerged in the district was a required expedient for 
immediate implementation. Borne of urgency imposed by 
the serious burden of illness affecting the city, opportunities 
for planning were also enabled by a unique set of public 
health resources. These resources include a major centre for 
virology with capacity for rapid real-time PCR diagnosis, 
presence of a major vaccine producer in Pune and a public 
health infrastructure that recognized a need to identify and 
address key tasks of pandemic preparedness. Epidemiological 
expertise enabled officials to monitor the course of the 
outbreak, a key task for control.41 Research studies conducted 
at the national diagnostic laboratory in Pune informed 
pandemic policy decisions and appropriate management of 
resources, such as the decision to start presumptive treatment 
and discontinue contact tracing. Several features of the Pune 
plan are particularly noteworthy, namely, the role of vaccines 
and the organization of health services. 
Vaccines
Notwithstanding the extraordinary resources for developing 
the LAIV in Pune with support of WHO and the resources 
of the SII, several issues limited the effectiveness of vaccines 
during the pandemic. At the outset when they were needed 
most, vaccines were unavailable. By the time the LAIV was 
developed and available, hesitancy and low uptake among 
health professionals and the general population limited 
effectiveness. Among healthcare providers, fear of serious 
side effects, such as Guillain-Barré syndrome or death, were 
the main reasons of low uptake. For the general population, 
however, limited coverage was more a matter of limited access, 
cost of the inactivated vaccine, low perceived personal risk 
after July 2010 when the LAIV became available, inadequate 
information and a perceived lack of a government mandate 
endorsing influenza vaccine.42 
As a result of these constraints, despite access to the vaccine 
at no cost for health professionals or at low cost for the LAIV 
vaccine in the general population, neither was enough to 
ensure appropriate use. Social and cultural determinants 
of vaccine acceptance, both facilitators and barriers, also 
played a role. It is notable that coverage problems typically 
attributed to vaccine hesitancy of communities in Western 
Europe and North America were less of an issue than 
hesitancy among health professionals to use and prescribe 
the available vaccine.42 Implications of vaccine hesitancy 
among professionals extend well beyond pandemic disease 
control to other settings, especially with regard to prescribing 
practices for high-risk groups, such as pregnant women, for 
whom seasonal influenza vaccination has become a priority 
for influenza control.3
Health services
The failure to ensure adequate health services capacity earlier 
was a result of waiting for an urgency-driven planning process 
of ad hoc measures. Limited local capacity was a serious 
problem for managing the initial surge of pandemic cases.8,43  
Earlier recognition of needs and consideration of strategies to 
meet surge demands would have been useful. Phadke suggests 
that failure of public and private sectors to interact was a 
serious problem, and overly restrictive criteria for diagnostic 
testing of a swab (ie, history of foreign travel or close contact 
with a known H1N1 case) resulted in missing many cases 
at the beginning of the outbreak.44 In India there is a huge 
and unregulated private health sector, and private doctors 
are often the first point of care for many people,45 including 
people with influenza during the 2009 pandemic in Pune.46 
A plan to involve private hospitals would have boosted capacity 
earlier. When the need to rethink a strategy was recognized, 
it took only two weeks for the local government to engage 
13 private hospitals with intensive care facilities conforming 
to the WHO’s recommendations. The WHO influenza 
guidance document advises inclusion of both public and 
private leadership in planning for influenza preparedness and 
response.27 Lack of credible information about the influenza 
pandemic40,44 was the key factor creating panic in the public 
and uncertainties among the private medical providers, who 
also had concerns about liability arising from media coverage 
of the first death in a private Pune hospital. Delayed treatment 
contributed to mortality. 
Legal and Ethical Framework of Pandemic Response
With regard to the legal framework for pandemic response, 
our review shows that as planning became a priority, existing 
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legislation enabled action in response to public health 
emergencies. But that legislation also required updating.47 
The Indian Epidemic Act of 1897 was dated, and it has been 
criticized as archaic and blunt,48 but as one of our policy-
maker respondents explained, for public health officials 
who needed to take extraordinary measures in response to 
the emergency, it proved to be useful. Ethical dimensions 
of public health action to protect human rights, which were 
considered in WHO’s global guide, were not discussed in the 
Indian national plan, although a public health authority in 
an article reflecting on avian flu outbreaks of 2005 suggested 
that it would be unethical not to employ public health tactics 
to prevent hardships, and that critical ethical concerns arose 
primarily from inadequate diagnostic capacity and services.49
Priority of Planning
Our respondents acknowledged a reluctance to plan unless 
pressed by emergency. In the plan that emerged, consideration 
of assessment, feedback and revision was lacking, although it 
had been recommended in the higher level planning guides. As 
Burkle advises, pandemics begin and end at the local level, and 
local assessment is critical but too often neglected.1,50 Statutory 
or regulatory planning requirements at district and state 
levels that mandate public health action may help to mitigate 
pandemics and serious outbreaks in the future. An approach 
to planning that involves a broad group of stakeholders 
should be considered, including administrators, public health 
officers, government and private hospital clinicians, private 
practitioners, vaccine manufacturers, laboratory scientists, 
media persons and community representatives. 
The influenza H1N1 virus has now become a seasonal strain, 
and it continues to cause deaths in all the age groups in 
India. Planning diagnostic and treatment healthcare services 
remains important, inasmuch as reports of high morbidity 
and mortality persist. Health education, vaccine promotion, 
identification of priority groups for vaccination and guidelines 
for managing outbreaks are required for effective control, not 
only of pandemic but also seasonal influenza. More serious 
attention to surveillance and planning and a wider role of 
vaccine prevention for seasonal or endemic influenza has been 
advocated by some authorities,51 primarily for selected high-
risk groups, especially pregnant women. Local strategies for 
control in the general population, whether or not they include 
vaccination, are also needed,52 but as serious illness associated 
with pandemic disease has become endemic, there is a risk of 
increasing needs in a context of diminished priority. 
Limitations
Our documentary review focussed on relevant global, 
national and state-level planning documents available in 
public domain, but it was not a comprehensive review of 
pandemic preparedness planning in other regions. Interviews 
of the five key informants were conducted three years after 
the pandemic; hence there is a possibility of recall bias. The 
three authoritative respondents who were unavailable for the 
interviews may also have provided additional insights. The 
study was undertaken in Pune for reasons explained in the text. 
The epidemiology and special resources that recommended it 
as an influenza study site must nevertheless be acknowledged 
as a limitation with regard to generalizability of locally held 
planning priorities and competencies. 
Conclusion 
The planning process for controlling pandemic influenza and 
persisting serious endemic influenza requires consideration of 
global, national and local responses. In India these responses 
are mediated through state- and district-level planning. 
Although experience varies at each of these levels, a planning 
process capable of acknowledging and addressing such 
variation is required. Our study of the experience and response 
to the influenza pandemic of 2009 recognized the initial panic 
before a planned public health response was developed and 
implemented as an ad hoc expedient. Measures included 
justifiable closure of schools, shopping centres, entertainment 
centres and cancellation of planned public gatherings. Such 
restrictions were enabled by the Epidemic Act of 1897.
The Pune plan for preparedness and response to the pandemic 
was a product of a management committee of public health 
officials. The plan addressed needs for diagnostic laboratory 
support, case management, non-pharmaceutical preventive 
measures, pharmaceutical interventions, and regular 
monitoring and feedback through public communications. It 
is broadly relevant in Pune and for consideration in India and 
other settings as a framework for pandemic preparedness. 
Our study shows the importance of district-level planning 
guided by higher level policy. It also indicates the challenges 
of implementing vaccine policy and organizing health system 
resources. 
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Appendix 1. In-depth Interview Guide for Local Level Health Officials
1.	 Qualification: Training and specialization, position(s) held
2.	 Description about course and development of 2009 H1N1 influenza Pandemic situation
3.	 How was the response strategy planned at district? 
4.	 Your role in pandemic management?
5.	 Your experiences: (Individual) clinical management protocol and (Community) pandemic management 
a. Administrative level: 
• Overall Information about OPD, In-Patient Department (IPD) and other facilities at district level
• Do you have pandemic preparedness plan for district?
• Did the district use any protocol or guidelines for clinical management of H1N1?
• Decision-makers, process of decision-making, communication with public health system, communication from public health 
system after declaring Phase 6: Pandemic phase
• Was there any spokesperson deputed at district level? Roles and responsibilities of the spokesperson? Media management/public 
relation officer/management 
• Whether any sensitization/orientation of clinicians, supporting staff took place?
• How was public health staff sensitized?
• Safety and precautionary measures used at district hospital level: vaccination, use of N-95 Masks, etc
• Reporting to District Collector, state in charge: frequency, type of reports
b. Patients Management: 
			b.1.	At OPD level: 
• Throat swabs: testing facilities, available treatment, number of staff, inter departmental co-ordination
• Profile of patients: area, symptoms, age group, class
• Challenges in differentiating patients with swine flu and other ILIs
• Use of Tamiflu: prevention [Prophylaxis] and/or treatment and side effects. Your view about ‘Tamiflu’
• Vaccine: When was it became available, information about efficacy of the vaccine, which kind of vaccine [Availability, 
manufacturers, cost, who were vaccinated on priority, side effects of vaccine for general public as well as pregnant women, for 
people with chronic illnesses like diabetes etc]
• Vaccine uptake during the pandemic situation
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• Your views about swine flu vaccine [applicability, effectiveness, herd immunity]
• Challenges faced at OPD level: Heavy patient load, counseling the patients
b.2. At IPD level: 
• Profile of patients: Area, symptoms, age group, class
• Isolation ward, Facilities at ICU, ventilators, number of beds, Availability of drugs, instruments, PPE
• How was additional beds/additional manpower arranged?
• Staff arrangement, staff training
• Ambulance service
• How many deaths happened due to swine flu: Profile of the death cases, complication observed in the cases, could those deaths 
have prevented?
• Post Mortem services: Challenges 
• Biological waste material management: 
• Challenges faced at OPD levels: expert manpower, infrastructure, handling patients and family members
• Steps taken by district in managing community level panic: Awareness programmes
• What role media played during the pandemic situation: Awareness creation, creating panic?
• Post pandemic Vaccine Use and Efficacy
• Key lessons for future preparedness
• For district: comparative picture: pandemic situation, today and steps for future
• For public health system 
• For private medical institutions 
• In clinical management of pandemic illnesses
• Media’s role
• Community’s role
• Medical associations’ role
• Role of non-allopath, etc
Appendix 2. Interview Guide for District Policy-Makers and Administrators
1.	 Qualification: Training and specialization, position(s) held
2.	 Description about course and development of 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic situation 
3.	 How the response strategy was planned at district level?
• Clinical management and public health measures employed for pandemic control
• Communication with public health system, communication from public health system after declaring Phase 6: Pandemic phase
• Need for evoking Epidemic Act
• Your role during the pandemic management
• Actors involved in planning the response
• Actors involved in implementing the response
• Coordination between centre, state and district 
• Role of media in pandemic management 
4.	 Your reflections on key successes and opportunities for improvement and financial Implications 
5.	 Key lessons and steps taken for future preparedness
• Steps for future preparedness including inter-pandemic activities regarding:
• District Administration
• For health system
• Media’s role
• Community’s role
